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1 |  INTRODUCTION
In the last few years the economic literature has devoted increasing attention to the functioning and 
effects of Emission Trading Systems (ETSs). An ETS is a cap‐and‐trade system that has the goal of 
reducing firms’ emissions by setting a price for emission allowances. In an ETS regulated firms are 
initially allocated a given number of emission allowances, either for free on the basis of historical 
emissions (grandfathering) or via an auctioning mechanism. Participants can subsequently exchange 
emissions allowances on the secondary market. Among existing ETSs, the largest and most famous 
scheme is certainly the European Emission Trading System (EU ETS) that was originally established 
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countries. This paper studies the impact of an ETS on the 
dynamics of the market made up of two types of firms: 
clean and dirty. Using an evolutionary context, we study 
how the share of clean firms evolves at different parameter 
values, such as increasing values of the permits’ price floor, 
and show that an ETS can have positive effects on the diffu-
sion of the clean technology. However, numerical simula-
tions show that under specific parameter values the opposite 
result may emerge with clean firms leaving the market.
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in 2005. The EU ETS has now several followers in other world areas, such as California, the Eastern 
cost of the United States (the so‐called Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative), Quebec and China, to 
mention just the most important ones (Borghesi, Montini & Barreca, 2016; International Carbon 
Action Partnership, 2017; World Bank, Ecofys and Vivid Economics, 2017). Today there are twenty‐
one ETSs operating in the world, covering 15 per cent of global emissions (International Carbon 
Action Partnership, 2018). Existing ETSs show remarkable differences but also striking similarities 
(Borghesi & Montini, 2016). One common feature that all ETSs share, for instance, is the progressive 
shift from grandfathering to auctioning. This shift has raised in all ETSs a debate on whether to set a 
minimum auction price (i.e. a price floor) to prevent prices from falling too much when permits’ de-
mand declines. Differently from the EU ETS, which has no price lower bound, most other ETSs have 
introduced a price floor, though in different ways (cf. Wood & Jotzo, 2011) and at different price 
levels.1 
The aim of this paper is to analyse, through an evolutionary game theoretical model,2  the effect of 
an ETS on the dynamics of clean and dirty firms that are subject to an emission permits scheme. 
Indeed, if the permit’s price increases companies could consider convenient to invest in a new more 
environmental‐friendly technology rather than keep on buying further permits, thus contributing to 
the technological shift that is needed to reduce polluting emissions.
Most of the studies on this topic have performed empirical estimations using either surveys of 
managerial interviews (see e.g., Hoffmann, 2007; Aghion, Veugelers & Serre, 2009; Rogge, Schneider 
& Hoffmann, 2011) or econometric modelling (see, e.g., Ellerman & Buchner, 2008; Borghesi, 
Cainelli & Mazzanti, 2015; Calel & Dechezlepretre, 2016). However, the empirical studies conducted 
so far generally find mixed evidence so that there is no consensus on the effects of the ETS on low‐
carbon innovations and on the diffusion of clean technologies (Martin, Muûls & Wagner, 2016).3 
While the empirical literature on this subject is quite extensive, the theoretical literature is rela-
tively scarce. Indeed, most of the theoretical works on ETSs deal with the optimal number of allow-
ances to be allocated on the market and on the related carbon prices (see, e.g., Grüll & Taschini, 2011; 
Fell, Burtraw, Morgenstern & Palmer, 2012; Kollenberg & Taschini, 2016; Perino & Willner, 2016). 
Several other studies (see, among others, Malueg, 1989; Milliman & Prince, 1989; Jung, Krutilla & 
Boyd, 1996; Unold & Requate, 2001; Requate, 2005) have focused on aggregate cost‐savings de-
riving from the adoption of new technologies in cap‐and‐trade systems. Only few theoretical works 
deal with the firms’ behavior looking at their ecoinnovation in response to the implementation of an 
ETS (Moreno‐Bromberg & Taschini, 2011; Antoci, Borghesi & Sodini, 2014). In particular, Moreno‐
Bromberg and Taschini (2011) examine the allowance prices formation process and its impact on the 
1 Price floor levels differ remarkably across ETSs, ranging from around 2.3 US dollars per ton of carbon dioxide (tCO2) in the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and $2.7/tCO2 in Beijing to around 10 US dollars (and rising at 5 per cent every year) in 
California. Also within the EU ETS, some national governments have supported the application of a lower bound in the price 
level. In particular, the UK has unilaterally decided to adopt a carbon price floor equal to £9/tCO2 for its electricity sector in 
2013, which initially doubled to £18/tCO2. The Dutch government has committed to do the same, while France has called for 
an EU‐wide price floor (Newbery, Reiner & Ritz, 2018).
2 Differently from random matching models in which agents interact randomly pairwise, we propose here a “population game” 
in which all agents indirectly interact with each other through the market. This can capture, for instance, one important feature 
of the EU ETS, namely, the fact that the activity of one agent subject to the EU ETS may affect that of any other agent regulated 
by the system through changes in the permits’ price, no matter the country the agents belong to.
3 Most empirical studies find that the EU ETS has had a limited impact on low‐carbon innovation promoting mainly small‐scale 
investments (Marcantonini, Teixido‐Figueras, Verde & Labandeira, 2017). In this paper, we will not discuss ETS‐related inno-
vation activities as we will assume clean and dirty technologies to be exogenously given, but we will rather look at the relative 
diffusion of such technologies in a population of firms subject to the ETS.
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incentive to adopt new technology under a transferable permits system in a non‐cooperative game 
theoretical model with strategic trading behaviors. The authors propose a self‐financing policy in-
strument (named European‐Cash‐4‐Permits) that can create dynamic incentives to invest in low pol-
lution‐emitting technologies and show that this new instrument may generate a floating price floor in 
the permit system. Antoci, Borghesi and Sodini (2014) also look at how a system of tradable permits 
may affect the diffusion of environment‐preserving technological innovations in the presence of sanc-
tions to non‐compliant firms. For this purpose, they set‐up a random matching model in which firms 
act strategically and decide whether to exchange permits based on the expected sanction suffered by 
non‐compliant firms.
The present paper differs from previous theoretical studies in several respects: (i) it studies the 
dynamic regimes characterized by the existence of clean and/or dirty firms; (ii) it shows the possible 
existence of a stationary state with dirty firms only; (iii) it examines the impact of a price floor on the 
dynamics of clean and dirty firms assuming competitive markets. To investigate this issue the pres-
ent paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 deals with output choices, 
replicator equations, and dynamic regimes. Numerical simulations are performed in Sections 4 and 5 
concludes.
2 |  THE MODEL
Let us consider the dynamics of a N‐size population of firms that produce a unique homogeneous good 
using different (polluting vs non‐polluting) technologies.4  Each firm has to choose between two pos-
sible strategies: using a polluting (“dirty”) technology that requires emission permits to carry on the 
production activity or using a non‐polluting (“clean”) technology that requires no permits to operate5 . 
Denoting clean and dirty firms with subscripts i = c, d respectively, we assume their profit functions 
to be as follows: 
where p is the unit price of the good produced by the firms, qi represent the quantities produced, 
C
f
i
> 0 and Cv
i
> 0 are the fixed and variable costs, respectively, pt indicates the unit price of tradable 
permits. Moreover, we assume that supply of available technologies is infinitely elastic and the num-
ber of firms of each type is not constrained by the available production factors.6 
To consider all possible cases, we allow the (fixed and variable) costs of clean firms to be higher 
than, equal to or lower than those of dirty firms, namely, Cjc
<
=
>
C
j
d
 (where j = f, v). Indeed, on the one 
hand adopting the clean technology can be more expensive than using the old one, but on the other 
hand labor productivity can be higher (and hence unit labor costs lower) in firms using the clean 
4 Energy provides a suitable example of a homogeneous good that can be produced using either clean or dirty technologies, e.g. 
renewable energy sources or fossil fuels. Indeed, the “Power and heat generation” industry represents the major sector subject 
to the EU ETS. In particular, the electric sector alone receives more than 40 percent of the total European Union Allowances 
allocated annually on the market (Martin, Muûls & Wagner, 2016).
5 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that firms cannot use both technologies simultaneously but adopt exclusively one of 
them at each point in time.
(1)
휋c = p ⋅qc−C
f
c−
Cv
c
2
⋅q2
c
휋d = p ⋅qd−C
f
d
−
Cv
d
2
⋅q2
d
−pt ⋅qd
6 We do not model here the production of the available technologies and the inputs market as this goes beyond the focus of the 
present work.
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technology (see, e.g., Chang, Graff Zivin, Gross & Neidell, 2016; Graff Zivin & Neidell, 2012; Graff 
Zivin & Neidell, 2013).7  Denoting with x  ∈  [0, 1] and 1−x the shares of clean and dirty firms, re-
spectively, the inverse demand of the good produced by the firms is given by the following linear 
function: 
where p > 0 is the reservation price and α > 0 measures the derivative of the output price with respect 
to aggregate output (namely, the slope of the demand function). The value 
[
qc ⋅x ⋅N + qd ⋅ (1−x) ⋅N
]
 
represents the aggregate output produced by the market (composed of both types of firms). Therefore, 
an increase of α and/or of qi results into a decrease of the output price.
Conversely, the permits demand is assumed to be proportional to the total output qd ⋅ (1−x) ⋅N 
produced by dirty firms and the unitary price pt of the permits is determined by the equation: 
where pt ≥ 0 is the exogenous price floor and β > 0 measures the derivative of the permits price with 
respect to dirty firms’ output. We assume that dirty firms buy permits only for production purposes. 
We exclude the existence of a secondary market and of permits demand for precautionary or specula-
tive reasons. Finally, dirty firms can buy any amount of emission permits at the prevailing price.8 
Each firm maximizes its own profit 휋i(x) taking p and pt as exogenously given. In other words, we 
assume perfect competition both in the output and in the permits market. The time evolution of x is 
assumed to be given by the well‐know replicator equation (see, among others, Hofbauer & Sigmund, 
1988; Weibull, 1995): 
where ẋ = dx∕dt is the time derivative of the share x. Dynamics (4) assumes that if adopting a clean 
technology is more profitable than using a dirty one, namely, 𝜋c(x) > 𝜋d(x), then the share of clean 
firms increases; the opposite occurs if 𝜋c(x) < 𝜋d(x). Finally, if 휋c(x) = 휋d(x), then the share of 
clean firms does not change over time.
3 |  DYNAMICS
In this section we present the quantities chosen by firms, the replicator equation, and the dynamic 
regimes that emerge from the analysis of the model.
7 Notice that if both fixed and variable costs of clean firms are lower than those of dirty firms, then the former will certainly 
enjoy higher profits than the latter (that have also to purchase the pollution permits). In this case, therefore, the strategy “clean” 
strictly dominates the strategy “dirty” and the dynamics of the model becomes trivial (all firms choose to be clean).
(2)p=p−훼 ⋅
[
qc ⋅x ⋅N+qd ⋅ (1−x) ⋅N
]
(3)pt=pt+훽 ⋅qd ⋅ (1−x) ⋅N
8 We implicitly assume the supply of the emission permits to be exogenously given by the regulator and price adjustments to be 
determined by changes in the demand side. In reality the regulator can modify the supply of permits adapting it to changes in 
environmental targets and economic circumstances. However, we assume here that the regulator is either unwilling or unable 
to modify the supply of permits (say, for political reasons) to counterbalance changes in the demand side.
(4)ẋ= x ⋅ (1−x) ⋅
[
𝜋c(x)−𝜋d(x)
]
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3.1 | Output choices
Given the value of variable x, the quantities qc and qd are chosen according to the first order conditions: 
 
 From the condition (5), it follows that clean firms always choose qc > 0 for p > 0, and therefore the 
value of qc is determined by the condition: 
 Differently from (5), the condition (6) could be satisfied for qd = 0 and 
𝜕𝜋d
𝜕qd
< 0. Therefore, dirty 
firms, which buy emission permits, could choose to produce a zero output, given x. Such an event can 
occur only if pt > 0 and, therefore, pt > 0 also for qd = 0. Consider first the case in which (6) is satis-
fied for qd > 0, and consequently the following condition holds: 
 From (7) and (8) it derives: 
and then: 
 Substituting Equations (2), (3), (10) in (8), we obtain: 
 Equation (11) determines the value of qd chosen by dirty firms. Setting qd = 0, we get: 
 The threshold value x̃ (represented as a vertical line in Figure 1a) separates the interval [0, x̃) where 
qd > 0 from the interval (̃x, 1] where qd = 0. Moreover, x̃ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if: 
 The following propositions show the equilibrium output values for x < �x and for x ≥ x̃ (see Equation 
(12)).
(5)휕휋c
휕qc
=p−Cv
c
qc≤0,
휕휋c
휕qc
⋅qc=0
(6)휕휋d
휕qd
=p−Cv
d
⋅qd−pt≤0,
휕휋d
휕qd
⋅qd =0
(7)휕휋c
휕qc
=p−Cv
c
⋅qc=0
(8)휕휋d
휕qd
=p−Cv
d
⋅qd−pt=0
(9)p−Cv
c
⋅qc=p−C
v
d
⋅qd−pt
(10)qc=
pt+
[
훽 ⋅ (1−x) ⋅N+Cv
d
]
⋅qd
Cv
c
(11)p−
(
1+
훼 ⋅x ⋅N
Cv
c
)
⋅pt=
(
훼 ⋅
[
훽 ⋅ (1−x) ⋅N+Cv
d
]
⋅x ⋅N
Cv
c
+(훼+훽) ⋅ (1−x) ⋅N+Cv
d
)
⋅qd
(12)x= x̃=
(
p−pt
)
⋅Cv
c
훼 ⋅pt ⋅N
(13)pt<p<
(
𝛼 ⋅N
Cv
c
+1
)
⋅pt
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Proposition 1 In the interval [0, x̃), that is when qd > 0, the equilibrium value of qd is given by 
the solution of Equation (11): 
and the equilibrium value of qc is given by (10): 
(14)q∗
d
=
p−
(
1+
훼⋅x⋅N
Cv
c
)
⋅pt(
훼⋅[훽⋅(1−x)⋅N+Cvd]⋅x⋅N
Cv
c
+(훼+훽) ⋅ (1−x) ⋅N+Cv
d
)
(15)q∗c =
pt+
[
훽 ⋅ (1−x) ⋅N+Cv
d
]
⋅q∗
d
Cv
c
F I G U R E  1  Dynamic regimes. Parameter values: Cfc = 1.5, Cfd = 0.75, Cvd = 1, p = 20, pt = 1, α = 0.5, β = 0.5, 
N = 5. Legend: • sinks, ∘ sources [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
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Proposition 2 In the interval [̃x, 1], where qd = 0, the equilibrium value of qc is given by con-
dition (5): 
3.2 | Replicator equation
Taking into account that p = Cv
c
⋅qc (from condition (5)) and that p = Cvd ⋅qd + pt (from condition 
(6)), in the interval [0, x̃), where qd > 0, the replicator equation becomes: 
while, in the interval [̃x, 1], where qd = 0, the replicator equation becomes: 
3.3 | Regimes
Numerical simulations show that under dynamics (4) three regimes in the interval [0, 1] may be 
observed:
1. the case in which the stationary state x = 1 is globally attractive. This occurs when the graph 
of 휋c(x) lies always above the graph of 휋d(x) (i.e. 𝜋c(x) > 𝜋d(x) ∀ x ∈ (0, 1)) so that the 
market is eventually composed of only clean firms (see Figure 1a in case of dynamics with 
qd ≥ 0, and Figure 1b in case of dynamics with qd > 0);
2. the case in which there exists an inner stationary state x∗ ∈ (0, 1). This occurs when the graph of 
휋c(x) crosses the graph of 휋d(x) at 0 < x = x∗ < 1 (i.e. 휋c(x∗) = 휋d(x∗)) so that both types of firms 
coexist at the equilibrium (see Figure 1c);
3. the case in which the stationary state x = 0 is globally attractive. This occurs when the graph of 
휋c(x) lies always below the graph of 휋d(x) (i.e. 𝜋c(x) < 𝜋d(x) ∀ x ∈ (0, 1)) so that the market is 
eventually composed of only dirty firms (see Figure 1d).9 
It is not possible to compute analytically the number of inner states that may be observed. However, 
from numerical simulations, it emerges that at most one internal state (x = x∗) may exist and it is always 
attractive.
(16)q̂c=
p
훼 ⋅x ⋅N−Cv
c
(17)ẋ= x ⋅ (1−x) ⋅
[
Cv
c
2
⋅
(
q∗
c
)2
−
Cv
d
2
⋅
(
q∗
d
)2
−Cf
c
+C
f
d
]
(18)ẋ= x ⋅ (1−x) ⋅
[
Cv
c
2
⋅
(
�qc
)2
−Cf
c
+C
f
d
]
9 The parameters underlying Figure 1 have been chosen so as to illustrate the various dynamic regimes that can emerge from the 
model. The regimes shown in the diagram hold also with different sets of parameter values, therefore the figure can be consid-
ered as representative of other parametric scenarios. Notice that in the present case we assumed the fixed costs of the clean 
technology to be twice as much as those of the dirty technology. This captures the possible existence of large fixed cost differ-
entials between clean and old technologies that is often argued to hinder the transition towards cleaner production processes. In 
Figure 1 the variable costs of clean technologies are instead allowed to range from much lower (one tenth) to much (fifteen 
times) higher than the variable costs of dirty technologies, to account for a wide range of cost differentials across different 
technologies.
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4 |  SIMULATIONS
In the present section we perform numerical simulations to analyse the evolution of the share x of 
clean firms and of their market share (MSc) that occurs when varying some key parameter values, 
namely, the permits’ price floor pt, the reactivity of the permits’ price to changes in the aggregate 
output of dirty firms β, and the variable costs ratio Cv
d
∕Cv
c
. We define MSc as: 
 The parameters underlying the simulations are the same as in Figure 1c, namely, the case in which 
both types of firms coexist.
Figure 2a shows how the share of clean firms and their market share grow at increasing values of 
the permits’ price floor pt. The growing trends emerging in the figure confirm our a priori expecta-
tions. Indeed, an increase in pt raises the permits’ price level, which reduces ‐ceteris paribus‐ the dirty 
(19)MSc=
q∗
c
⋅x ⋅N
q∗
c
⋅x ⋅N+q∗
d
⋅ (1−x) ⋅N
F I G U R E  2  Evolution of the share of clean firms x and their market share MSc at increasing values of pt, β, 
Cv
d
∕Cv
c
 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
(a) (b)
(c)
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firms’ profits inducing a lower (higher) share of firms to choose the “dirty” (“clean”) strategy. A 
higher permits’ price floor, moreover, reduces also the output produced by dirty firms (see Equation 
(14)). This, together with the lower share of dirty firms, reduces their market share, thus increasing its 
complement to one (i.e. the market share of clean firms). As the figure shows, clean firms do not need 
a permits’ price floor to “conquest” a good share of the market (their market share being above 55 per 
cent even when pt = 0). However, the introduction of a permits’ price floor can rapidly increase both 
the share of clean firms and their market share, eventually inducing dirty firms to disappear from the 
market. Given our initial parameter values, in the present context this occurs when pt gets slightly 
above 4.5. This suggests that the government can affect the composition of the ETS‐regulated market 
and eventually induce all firms to move to a clean technology by properly introducing a permits’ price 
floor.10 
Figure 2b shows how clean firms and their market share change at different values of β.11  As one 
might expect, an increase in β is accompanied by higher values of both x and MSc. In fact, an increase 
in β raises ‐ceteris paribus‐ the permits’ price. This reduces the profits of dirty firms, increasing the 
share of clean firms in the market. Furthermore, higher values of β tend to decrease (increase) the 
output produced by dirty (clean) firms (see Equations (14) and (15)). Notice that if β is sufficiently 
low (close to 0 in Figure 2b), no firm adopts the clean technology at the equilibrium (x = 0). As a 
matter of fact, in this case all firms will prefer to use the dirty technology and ask for permits as this 
will not increase much the permits’ price (the price reactivity being low). Also observe that both the 
share and the market share of clean firms grow at decreasing rates as β grows. Indeed, a rise in β ini-
tially causes a rapid increase in both variables. However, this growth slows down (and the curve flat-
tens out) as x approaches 1 since the number of dirty firms gets lower and lower, therefore at higher 
values of β only few firms can still change their strategy and become clean. The growth of x, moreover, 
gets progressively slower also because higher β values tend to reduce the overall output by dirty firms, 
as pointed out above. This lowers permits’ price, ceteris paribus, thus decreasing the incentive for 
dirty firms to change their technology.
Finally, Figure 2c shows the evolution of x and MSc at increasing values of the variable costs ratio. 
The latter can be interpreted as an increase in the relative costs of the dirty technology compared to 
the clean one. As emerges from the figure, in this case x and MSc show different trends: U‐shaped 
for x, monotonically increasing for MSc. This suggests that an improvement in the new technology 
compared to the old one may initially have adverse effects on the evolution of the clean firms. In 
fact, a reduction in the costs of the non‐polluting technology tends to increase the profits of clean 
firms and, consequently, to decrease the share of dirty firms. However, this tends to decrease ‐ceteris 
paribus‐ the aggregate demand of permits and thus also the permits price. This mechanism increases 
(decreases), in the early stages, the share of dirty (clean) firms themselves. However, if the costs ratio 
keeps increasing (so that the new technology becomes increasingly more convenient) the incentive to 
10 The price floor could be treated as an endogenous ‐rather than exogenous‐ policy variable which is set by the regulator ac-
cording to some policy rule so as to increase the share of clean firms. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this 
possible extension of the present work that is left for future research.
11 Recall that β measures how permits’ price reacts to changes in aggregate permits’ demand (that are in a 1:1 relationship with 
the overall output of dirty firms). Policy‐makers can affect this parameter through appropriate regulatory measures. This is the 
case, for instance, of the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) in the EU ETS, which has been conceived “to improve the system’s 
resilience to major shocks”. This measure, that transfers back‐loaded and unallocated allowances to a reserve (and eventually 
cancels them in case of prolonged imbalances), is likely to affect how much permits’ prices react to changes in aggregate de-
mand since the supply of auctioned permits adapts de facto to changes in the permits’ demand. See European Commission 
(2015), Hepburn, Neuhoff, Acworth, Burtraw and Jotzo (2016) and the literature cited therein, for an in‐depth description of 
how the MSR works and its implications.
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adopt the clean technology prevails over the benefits deriving to dirty firms from lower permits’ price 
so that x will eventually rise, which may explain the U‐shaped curve that can be observed in the dia-
gram. This possible outcome has interesting policy implications. In fact, if the policy‐maker increases 
by only a limited amount the variable costs ratio (by taxing a dirty technology or subsidising a clean 
one), this may have unexpected effects, reducing the share of clean firms but increasing their portion 
of the market.
5 |  CONCLUSIONS
Emission Trading Schemes are one of the most widely used policy instruments to control emission 
levels and reduce pollution. However, only few theoretical models have investigated the impact of 
ETS on the diffusion of a non polluting technology in a behavioral context. To fill this gap in the 
literature, this paper proposes a simple dynamic evolutionary model that can describe a competitive 
market of tradable permits.
The theoretical framework proposed here is similar to a biological competition model (in which 
different species compete for a common resource). In the present case, in fact, all firms are in competi-
tion among themselves since the supply of each firm (no matter whether clean or dirty) tends to lower 
the price of the homogeneous good. Moreover, a decrease in x (the share of clean firms), increases the 
permits’ price pt thus damaging the existing dirty firms (i.e. it makes strategy dirty less convenient).
From the analysis of the model it emerges that three dynamic regimes may be observed: (1) an 
economy with only clean firms, (2) an economy with only dirty firms, (3) coexistence between firms. 
In the first case, the ETS market eventually disappears (there are no more dirty firms buying permits in 
the end) but its functioning contributes to achieve what we can call a complete decarbonization of the 
economy. In the second case, the ETS remains very active (as all firms need permits to pollute) but its 
presence fails to achieve the transition towards a clean economic system. In the third (and most realis-
tic) case, clean and dirty firms coexist in the market and none of the two kinds of firms goes extinct. 
Moreover, numerical simulations show that by increasing the permits’ price floor the share of clean 
firms progressively increases until it eventually gets to 1. This result seems particularly important 
since it suggests that the regulator can favor the diffusion of a clean technology through a sufficiently 
high price floor. Numerical simulations also show the possible existence of non‐linear effects in the 
diffusion of new technologies, so that the share of clean firms first paradoxically decreases before start 
increasing as the new technology gets relatively more convenient (i.e. as the variable costs ratio rises).
The results presented in this paper should be conceived as a first and preliminary step in a new 
research direction, namely, the investigation of the ETS effects on the diffusion of a clean technology 
using an evolutionary game theoretical framework that can capture the existence of strategic and 
imitative behaviors. More precisely, in our model firms “imitate” the others adopting the strategy 
that turns out to be on average the most remunerative one in the population, and behave “myopically” 
in the sense that they do not consider the future consequences of their choice (i.e. they are not for-
ward‐looking). Despite its analytical simplicity, however, the model can provide some relevant policy 
indications, particularly on the appropriate level of the price floor. The presence of lower bounds in 
the price level has recently proved to be very important in preventing price from collapsing in several 
ETSs worldwide (e.g. in California, in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative that encompasses nine 
Eastern States of the USA, in the pilot project of Guangdong in China etc...), especially during the 
recent economic crisis that drastically lowered the permits’ demand in several ETSs. By describing 
the trajectories that emerge from different price floors, the model can give policy makers important 
486 |   ANTOCI eT Al.
indications on how to set minimum auction prices and operate fine tuning policies that may drive a 
progressive shift from dirty to clean technologies in the future.
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